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Recent literature on military expenditures in the economic system has pointed out in recent 
years that China's role as not only economic but also military power, is becoming increasingly 
important, leading to China's emergence as a world military power capable of undermining 
the United States supremacy.  
The analysis undertaken tests the hypothesis that, in China, unlike the US, the increase in 
military spending is essentially due to the increase in GDP made available by Chinese 
economic boom. On the other hand, in US, the high military expenditures and its trend is the 
result of a strategic decision determined only partially and to a limited extent by GDP trends. 
Hypotheses validation implies that increase in Chinese military expenditure is fully explained 
by increase in GDP. On the other hand, in the United States, the variation in GDP explains 
only a part of variation in military spending, suggesting the possibility of investigating other 
factors determining their variation. The empirical analysis is performed through an 
econometric analysis accomplished using Toda-Yamamoto approach to Granger causality, 
impulse response function and variance decomposition analysis.  
Keywords: China, USA, military expenditures, GDP, causal relationship, Toda-Yamamoto 
Granger causality test, IRF, FEVD. 
Declarations of interest: none 
1 Introduction 
The role of military expenditure within the economic system is controversial, “It is crucial to suppress the 
economic imbalances or inequities to have a sustainable peace. Here, economic analysis can help decision-
makers re-allocate public spending to focus on the most relevant issues, not on those which seem to have 
the most immediate results.”1 
 “The political economy of defense spending is enormously important given its magnitude and its global 
implication” (Gentilucci, 2019).  
A lot of studies deal with the rising role and power of Chinese economy relative to that of United States 
(Malkin, 2020), but not many studies deal with the increasing size and role of the military in China relative 
to United States. Beckley (2012) point out that an analysis of the hegemony between the two countries 
must be did analysing also the military capabilities of the two countries. Schwartz (2019, p.507) emphasizes 
the US military superiority “over the geo-political rivals”, in this case the military power is seen as an 
“infrastructural power”.  
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate on the role and evolution of global military spending in 
the economic system. In the literature often military expenditures are considered as a proxy of military 
power, Arvanitidis and Kollias (2016, p. 41) claim that “military expenditures are essentially the costs of 
producing military power”. Some other scholars point out that “military force is a convenient tool to fulfil a 
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state’s national interests of value expansion, prestige augmentation, and security assurance”(Lee, 2008, p. 
529).  
The analysis will be carried out through a comparison between China and the United States. In particular, 
the growth of Chinese military spending is increasingly part of the current debate (Zhong et al. 2017; 
Dimitraki and Menla Ali, 2013; Menla Ali and Dimitraki, 2014) and results are not unambiguous. The 
research will take into account the evolution of these expenditures within the national economic system, 
comparing them to those of the leading country in the sector, the United States. Recent literature on 
military spending places a very strong emphasis on the strategic link between the increase in military 
spending and the increasingly militaristic character of Chinese growth in the global context. In these last 
years, some scholars (Chen and Feffer, 2009; Arvanitidis and Kollias, 2016, etc. ) of military expenditures in 
the economic system have pointed out that China's role as not only economic but also military power, is 
becoming increasingly important, leading to China's emergence as a world military power capable of 
undermining United States in their supremacy. One may wonder if and to what extent this constitutes a 
new and deliberate strategy2 of China.  
The hypothesis that will be tested with empirical analysis, brings a new light on the role of the link between  
military and GDP in Chinese and American economy. In particular, the study will try to highlight whether 
the increase in military spending is really a deliberate political choice or rather the result of China's 
extraordinary economic expansion. To try to answer this question it seems pertinent to assess the 
evolution of military spending and gross domestic product in the two countries.  
A first intuitive hypothesis that would make it possible to explain the huge increase in the level of Chinese 
military expenditures is certainly linked to the possible correlation between these types of expenditure and 
the trend of the country's Gross Domestic Product. Particularly, the analysis that will be carried out will test 
the hypothesis that, in China, unlike the United States, the increase in military spending is essentially due to 
the increase in GDP made available by Chinese economic boom. On the other hand, in the United States, 
the high military expenditures and its trend is the result of a strategic decision determined only partially 
and to a limited extent by GDP trends. If this were verified, it would suggest that other factors affect the 
evolution of military expenditures in the economic system. In particular it could support the thesis that the 
level and trend of military expenditure is the result of power interpenetrations, spanning from military 
spending to economic growth (or GDP) and/or from economic growth (or GDP) to military spending.  
So, in order to test these hypothesis I think that the tool of causality is appropriate, so this study will 
perform an econometric analysis using the Toda-Yamamoto approach to Granger causality, the impulse 
response function and the variance decomposition analysis. 
To the best of my knowledge, not many are studies have tried to apply the Toda-Yamamoto approach to 
Granger causality test in the field of military expenditures and economic growth. Moreover, I’m not aware 
of studies that jointly apply Toda-Yamamoto's analysis, impulse response function and variance 
decomposition analysis. 
This study is organized as follows: Section 2 shows an overview of the evolution of Chinese and American 
military expenditures; section 3 presents the literature review; section 4 describes the methodology, in 
particular the empirical model and data. ; section 5  shows the results of econometric analysis. Section 6 
presents the principal stylized facts and conclusions of this study.  
2 An overview on Chinese and American evolution of military 
expenditures and GDP 
On the basis of the data of Sipri Yearbook 2019, this study shows the principal trends of military 
expenditures at constant US dollars, of military expenditures as a percentage of GDP and of military 
expenditures as a percentage of central government expenditures, during the period 1989-2018.  
                                                             
2
 While fully recognizing that the strategy of a nation must be analyzed through a complex analysis of a set of political, 
economic, geographical factors etc., in this context, and in order to be integrated into the current debate on the 
military power of the two states (China and USA), the deliberate strategy is analyzed through the exclusive analysis of 
two macroeconomic variables: military spending and GDP. 
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Data show that although Chinese military expenditures have never stopped increasing for thirty years, they 
have not yet reached the level of American military expenditures and remain much lower (Figure 1). In 
2018, it stood at a constant 239 223 million of constant dollars in China, while it reached the level of 633 
565 million of constant dollars in the United States. Consequently, Chinese military expenditures in 2018 
represent just under one third of American military expenditures. The evolution of military expenditure per 
capita confirms this trend (Figure 2): per capita military spending in the United States stands at just under 




Figure 1 Military expenditure by country in constant price 
(2017) US$ (millions), presented according to calendar year, 
and in current (2018) US$m. for 2018. Source: Sipri 2019. 
My elaboration. 
 
Figure 2 Military expenditure per capita, in current US$, 
presented according to calender year. Source: Sipri 2019. My 
elaboration. 
An analysis of the evolution of military expenditure as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product shows that 
the share devoted to military expenditure in the USA is significantly higher than in China (Figure 3). In 1989, 
the share of GDP invested in military expenditure was 5.5% and 2.5% in the USA and China respectively. In 
2018 the respective shares of the two countries are 3.2% and 1.9%. In contrast to the share of military 
expenditures in American GDP, the Chinese share remains rather stable over the time period considered, 
while the American share seems to vary more. A common tendency to decrease the share of the two 
countries is to be registered immediately after the end of the Cold War, in the period in which it was 
theorized and hoped for a disinvestment in military spending, with a view to global pacification, and at the 
same time a reallocation of these resources to social purposes. This is what the literature defines as "the 
peace dividend". This trend stopped suddenly in 1999, when military expenditures and the share of GDP 
dedicated to them began to grow again. However, in China the level of 2% is exceeded (even if only slightly) 
in very few years, overall it is pointed out that the part of the GDP dedicated to military expenditures in 
recent years is around 2% without significant variations. In the United States, the part of the GDP dedicated 
to military spending follows a sort of cyclical trend since 1989 and has almost never fallen below 3%. These 
data therefore lead us to affirm that the share of military spending on GDP does not demonstrate an 
evident change toward a more militaristic strategy3 in China in the allocation of GDP resources to military 
spending, in fact the share is decreasing from the starting data and rather stable during the time. It should 
also be noted that the correlation coefficient between the share of military expenditure on GDP in the two 
                                                             
3









































































































countries is positive and equal to 0.6: this element shows that there is a rather important positive 
correlation in the choices of the two countries, although they are made on a different scale.  
The share of military expenditures on government expenditures in the two countries from 2001 to 2018 
(Figure 4) shows that China, has constantly decreased the share of government expenditures dedicated to 
military expenditures, in particular between 2007 and 2008 the share of military expenditures on 
government expenditures has decreased by 2%, between 2001 and 2018 the share of Chinese military 
expenditures on total military expenditures has decreased from 11.98% to 5.5% thus reducing by more 
than half. In the United States, on the other hand, the share of military expenditures in government 
expenditures is not only much higher than in China, but above all, during the period studied, this ratio grew 
considerably between 2001 and 2006, and then remained at very high levels (around 12%) until 2011. Since 
2012, the share of military spending in government expenditures has started to decrease to 9%, which is 
only 0.1% lower than the share of military spending in 2001.  
 
Figure 3 Military expenditure for China and USA as share of gross 
domestic product, 1989-2018. Source: Sipri 2019. My elaboration 
 
Figure 4 Military expenditures as a percentage of general 
government expenditures in the period 2001-2018. Source: 
Sipri 2019. My elaboration. 
 
3 Litterature review 
Since Benoit's seminal work (1973, 1978), finding positive influence between defense expenditures and 
economic growth,  numerous studies on the evaluation of the impact of military spending on the economic 
system have followed, without, however, reaching a consensus on the results, which instead often appear 
to be contradictory4. The findings of the studies in the literature are inconclusive and vary depending on 
the countries examined, samples, and econometric methods. So not only there is no consensus regarding 
the direction of causality but still there is no consensus as to whether military expenditure has a positive, a 
negative or a neutral effect on economic growth. 
“Most of the studies on the defence-growth relationship are based on the Neoclassical or Keynesian 
theoretical frameworks, which allow the development of consistent formal models. While Neoclassical 
models concentrate on supply-side (modernisation, positive externalities from infrastructure, technological 
spin-offs), Keynesian models concentrate on demand-side (crowding-out of investment, exports, education, 
health)” (Dunne and Nikolaidou, 2001). Neoclassical studies include Biswas and Ram (1986), Alexander 
(1990), Mintz and Huang (1990), Mintz and Stevenson (1995), Sezgin (1996), Murdoch, Pi and Sandler 
(1997), Nikolaidou (1998a). Among the Keynesian studies we can find Smith (1980), Lim (1983), Faini, Annez 
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and Taylor (1984), Chletsos and Kollias (1995). Researchers have adopted different econometric model to 
study the defence-growth nexus: time series, cross-section or panel studies such as the Feder-Ram model 
(Feder, 1983; Biswas and Ram, 1986), Deger-type model (Deger and Smith, 1983; Deger, 1986), the 
endogenous growth model (Barro, 1990), the augmented Solow growth model (Mankiw and al., 1992) and 
the new macroeconomic model (Romer, 2000; Taylor, 2000).  
A large literature has used Granger (1969) causality tests to examine the interaction of military spending 
with the economy, for instance, Dunne and Smith (1990), Madden and Hasleuhurst (1995), Chang et al. 
(2001), Smith and Dunne (2002), Tang et al. (2009), Meng et al. (2013), Menyah and Wolde-Rufael (2013). A 
lot of study deepen on the Granger causality relationship between military expenditures and GDP, for 
instance, Joerding (1986), Kinsella (1990), Kollias (1997), Gold (1997), Chowdhury (1991), Chen (1993), 
Kollias and Makrydakis (2000), Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn (2003), Kollias et al. (2004, 2007), Dunne and 
Nikolaidou (2001), Dunne, Nikolaidou and Vougas (2001), Al-Yousif (2002), Atesoglu (2002), Morales-Ramos 
(2002), Kollias, Naxakis and Zarangas (2004), Lai, Huang and Yang (2005), Karagol and Palaz (2004), Narayan 
and Singh (2007), Pradhan (2010), Zhong et al. (2017), Hatemi et al. (2018). In particular Zhong and al. 
(2017) performed an analysis to evaluate the causal linkages between military expenditures and economic 
growth in the BRICS and the US and Chang and al. (2014) performed an Granger causality study for China 
and G7 countries, pointing out the causal links between military expenditures and economic growth, in 
particular they causality from real GDP to military expenditures is founded.  
However, not many studies have tried to apply the Toda-Yamamoto approach to Granger causality test in 
the field of military expenditures and economic growth. Among them there is the work of Abu‐qarn (2010) 
which revisits the defence–growth nexus for the rivals of the Israeli–Arab conflict over four decades 
utilizing the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) causality test and the generalized variance decomposition. Ozun & 
Erbaykal (2014) examined the causal relationship between defense spending and economic growth  in the 
case of selected NATO countries for the period of 1949-2006. The results show that unidirectional causality 
exists in seven NATO countries while for five countries no causal relationships were found. On the other 
hand, Turkey differs from other countries in that the relationship is bilateral. Others studies applying the 
Toda-Yamamoto procedure to the relationship between military expenditures and economic Growth are 
the following: Aminu & Abu Bakar (2015),  
Wolde-Rufael (2014) applies the Toda-Yamamoto procedure to the analysis of military expenditures and 
income inequality. Another study by Raza & al. (2016), utilizes the Toda-Yamamoto and variance 
decomposition approaches in order to analyze relationship between military expenditures and income 
inequality.  
4 Methodology  
4.1 Data Sources 
The annual data used in this study covers the period from 1989 to 2018 for both the countries taken into 
account (China and US). The data on military expenditure for China and United States are carried out from 
the Sipri 2020 database and World Bank online Database 2020.  
The variables used in this study include the military expenditures at current US dollars, the military 
expenditures at constant US dollars, military expenditures as a percentage of GDP, military expenditures as 
a percentage of government expenditures, all of which have been taken from the Sipri online database 
2020.  
The annual rate of growth of GDP measured in constant US dollars has been taken from the World Bank 
online database 2020.  
4.2 Econometric analysis 
“Using Vector Autoregressive (VAR) models has the advantage that they are dynamic specifications, 
7 
 
free of economic assumptions imposed a priori” (Dunne, 2001). In order to perform the econometric 
analysis and to evaluate the strategic role of military expenditures in the economic system of the two 
countries, I utilize a time series analysis for the two countries based on the following tools: 
 The Toda and Yamamoto (1995) procedure to test for Granger causality in order to examine the 
economic causal relationship among endogenous variables, in this case between military 
expenditures and GDP. This procedure is based in the estimation of an augmented VAR that 
guarantees the asymptotic distribution of the Wald statistic. This procedure does not require 
pretesting for integration or cointegration, so it avoids the potential biases of pre-testing. In 
estimating the MWALD test for granger causality, it is prerequisite to determine the maximum 
possible order of the integration of the basic variables (dmax) using a unit roots test. Therefore, the 
first step was to run the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test in order to determine dmax5. 
The second step was the determination of the optimal lag length (k). By identifying dmax and k, a 
level VAR model of order (k + dmax) is estimated and zero restrictions test is conducted on lagged  
 
𝑌1𝑡 =  𝜇1 +   𝛽11,𝑘𝑌1𝑡−𝑘 +  𝛽12,𝑘𝑌2𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜀1𝑡𝑝+𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑘=1
𝑝+𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑘=1  
𝑌2𝑡 =  𝜇2 +  𝛽21,𝑘𝑌1𝑡−𝑘 +  𝛽22,𝑘𝑌2𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜀1𝑡𝑝+𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑘=1
𝑝+𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑘=1  
where long-run Granger causality from variable Y2 to variable Y1 is evaluated by testing the null 
hypothesis that β 12,1 =…= β12, p , and causality from variable Y1 to Y2 is examined by testing the null 
hypothesis that β21,1 =…=β21, p= 0 . 
 The impulse response function (IRF) using the traditional orthogonalized Cholesky method. This set 
of  statistics often used to evaluate a VAR is to simulate some shocks to the system and trace out 
the effects of those shocks on endogenous variables. However, it must be kept in mind that the 
shocks were correlated across equations. 
 The forecast-error variance decomposition (Fevds) which measures the extent to which each shock 
contributes to unexplained movements (forecast errors) in each variable in a VAR system. So the 
method enables scholars to detect not only the direction, but also the intensity of causal 
relationship between variables.  
5 The econometric analysis 
The focus of this research is to test the starting hypotheses. evaluating the relationship between the two 
fundamental variables in the China and in US, namely the gross domestic product and the military 
expenditure.  
First of all, and before deepening in the econometric analysis,  it’s interesting to evaluate the correlation 
between military expenditures at constant prices and constant GDP in the two countries.  
Table 1 - Correlation rate between the annual growth rate of military expenditure at constant prices and the annual growth rate 
of gross domestic product. Data sources: Sipri 2019 e World Bank. My elaboration. 
 Correlation between the constant Military Expenditures (ME) and the constant GDP (g) 
China 1,00 
USA 0,66 
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 The maximum degree of integration of the variables. 
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In particular, this analysis (Table 1) shows that the Chinese military expenditure at constant prices is 
perfectly positive correlated with the GDP in the Chinese economy, while for the United States, there is an 
average correlation between the two variables considered.  
This result makes it possible to investigate whether there is causality between the two variables and the 
possible impact of such causality in the two countries considered. This section proposes to carry out this 
analysis with the help of econometric techniques. In particular, as mentioned in the methodology section, 
three main tools will be used: Toda-Yamamoto's approach to Granger's causality, the Impulse Response 
Function, and the Forecast Error Variance Decomposition.  
 
5.1 The Toda-Yamamoto Granger causality test for China 
 
In order to assess whether there is a causality, in the economic sense of the term, between GDP and 
military expenditure, the objective is to perform an analysis through the Toda-Yamamoto Granger causality 
test. 
First of all, since the values at the level of the two historical series considered and their respective 
logarithms are not stationary, they must be made stationary. 
In order to evaluate the stationarity of the series we refer to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test.  
 
Table 2 – Results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test for d2lnGDP in China 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs = 2525 
   Interpolated Dickey-Fuller 
 Test 
Statistc 







Z(t) -4.016 -2.660 - -1.950 -1.600 
D. 
d2lnGDP 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
L1 -1.013335 .2523407 -4.02 0.001 -1.535342 -.491329 
LD .1483961 .1634769 0.91 0.373 -.1897816 .4865739 
 
In the case of the Dickey-Fuller test for the variable d2lnGDP, the estimation of the reference model shown 
above, allows to evaluate the validity of the choice of the lag. In particular, if the highest lag corresponds to 
a t of Student (non-standard) in absolute value lower than 1.645, the test is performed again, reducing the 
lag, until the highest lag is significant (|t|> 1.645). In our case we have that 4.02 > 1.645, therefore the 
choice of lag is valid.  
We can then move on to the analysis of the Dickey-Fuller test results. From the comparison in absolute 
value of the statistic test t, of the ADF test (4.016) with the critical value at 5% (1.950), it emerges that the 
first is greater than the second in absolute value, so we can reject the null hypothesis and say that the 
series is stationary.   
It proceeds in the same way for the analysis of the military expenses in logarithmic form and from the 
analysis it emerges that the series is stationary to the first differences I(1) as it is shown in the table of the 
variable d1lnME.   
So I can conclude that the maximum order of integration for the group of time series (dmax) is equal to 
two. 
Table 3 – Results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test for d1lnME in China 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs = 2526 
   Z(t) has t-distribution 
 Test 
Statistc 









Z(t) -2.724 -2.500 - -1.914 -1.319 
D. d1lnME Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
L1 -.6934861 .25455686 -2.72 0.012 -1.220101 -.1668709 
LD -.1445744 .1942308 -0.74 0.464 -.5463714 .2572226 
cons .0563123 .0258057 2.18 0.040 .0029291 .1096955 
 
Secondly, we set up a VAR model in level and determine the appropriate maximum lag length (p) for the 
variables in the VAR (p) using the usual information criteria. In order to perform the causality analysis, the 
number of lags needed for the VAR model to be estimated is established. 
Table 4 - Optimal number of lag for the VAR model in China 
Selection-order criteria 
Sample: 1994-2018 Number of obs = 25 
lag LL LR df p FPE AIC HQIC SBIC 
0 7.6977    .002173 -.455816 -.428771 -.358306 
1 116.992 218.59 4 0.000 4.8e-07 -8.87936 -8.79823 -8.5868. 
2 130.312 26.64 4 0.000 2.3e-07 -9.62497 -9.48974 -
9.13742* 
3 134.183 7.7409 4 0.102 2.4e-07 -9.61461 -9.42529 -8.93204 







Endogenous: lnME lnGDP 
Exogenous: cons 
 
The lag lenght is selected based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC). The optimal number of lags is 
therefore 4 based on the AIC criterion and most criteria. This show that the la length prior to the 
augmentation is determinate as 4 where used the appropriate lag of the model in six due to the condition 
of VAR (p+dmax) 
To test the VAR model for the serial correlation in residuals 
Table 5 - Lagrange-multiplier test for VAR in China 
Lagrange multiplier test 
lag  ch i2 df Prob > ch i2 
1 7.1157 4 0.12990 
2 2.3252 4 0.67619 
 H0: no autocorrelation at lag order 
 
The results show that there is no serial correlation in residuals for our VAR model at 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level.  
Now, after we know that the value of p+d=6 for the VAR (unrestricted) and p=4 for the VAR (restricted), we 
will perform the Granger causality test as follows: 
. quiet var lnME lnGDP, lags (1/6) 
Table 6 - Toda-Yamamoto Granger causality test from lnME to lnGDP for China 
. testTest  [lnGDP] L1.lnME [lnGDP] L2.lnME [lnGDP] L3.lnME 
(1) [lnGDP]L.lnME = 0 
(2) [lnGDP]L2.lnME = 0 
(3) [lnGDP]L3.lnME = 0 
(4) [lnGDP]L4.lnME = 0 
chi2(  4)      = 6.47 
Prob > chi2 = 0.1669 




Table 7 - Toda-Yamamoto Granger causality test from lnGDP to lnME for China 
. test [lnME] L1.lnGDP [lnME] L2.lnGDP [lnME] L3.lnGDP 
(1) [lnME]L.lnGDP = 0 
(2) [lnME]L2.lnGDP = 0 
(3) [lnME]L3.lnGDP = 0 
(4) [lnME]L4.lnGDP = 0 
chi2(  4) =   33.00 
Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
 
The previous Toda-Yamamoto Granger causality test tests Granger's causality from GDP to military 
spending. From the analysis of Toda-Yamamoto causality, it emerges that, for China, there is a causality 
from GDP to military expenditure, but not from military expenditure to GDP. This result confirms our 
starting hypothesis that the increase in Chinese military expenditures follows the exploit in GDP growth 
that characterizes this country. So I can argue that over time military expenditure has been only a response to 
economic growth, a sort of economic dependence.  
5.2 Impulse response function (IRF) for China 
Considering that the results of the T-Y Granger causality test show a causality from GDP to military 
expenditure, but not vice versa, I calculated the IRF, ordering the variables in this sense, i.e. first the GDP 
then the ME. However, in order to assess the reliability of the results the IRF was tested giving the reverse 
order to the variables. The results obtained are highlighted at the end of the paragraph. 
 
Figure 5 Impulse response function for China 
The horizontal axis for each graph is in the units of time that your VAR is estimated in, in this case years; 
hence, the impulse–response graph shows the effect of a shock over a 8-years period. The vertical axis is in 
units of the variables in the VAR; in this case, everything is measured in percentage points, so the vertical 
units in all panels are percentage point changes. 
The first row shows the effect of a one-standard-deviation impulse to the GDP equation. A standard 
deviation shock to GDP determines a decrease of military expenses in the first year, after the first year and 











0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4 6 8
var1, lnGDP, lnGDP var1, lnGDP, lnME
var1, lnME, lnGDP var1, lnME, lnME
95% CI orthogonalized irf
step
Graphs by irfname, impulse variable, and response variable
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slowly, although remaining in the positive region. The graphs is inside the 95% percent interval of 
confidence. Overall  a shock to GDP will have positive impact on military expenditures both in the short run 
and in the long run because the graph is in the positive region.  
The second row shows the effect of a one-standard-deviation impulse to the ME equation. The first thing to 
notice is that the effect is zero in the current period (at zero lag). This is a direct result of our identification 
assumption: we imposed the condition that military expenditures has no immediate effect on GDP in order 
to identify the shocks.  A standard deviation shock to ME results in a slight increase in GDP until the fifth 
year, which then stabilizes. Overall a shock to military expenditures will have a positive impact on GDP both 
in the short and long run because the graph is above the zero. 
In conclusion these results are consistent with the a priory expectations because military expenditures 
grows following GDP shock, as hypothesized in our model and as inferred from the conclusions of T-Y 
Granger causality test. 
IRFs can be sensitive to the identification assumptions we make. I computed IRFs for alternative orderings 
and I find that the results are similar, then I gain confidence that my conclusions are not sensitive to the  
assumptions I make about contemporaneous causality. 
 
5.3 Forecast-error variance decomposition (FEVDs) in China 
 
Another tool that is available for analysis of identified VARs is the forecast-error variance decomposition, 
which measures the extent to which each shock contributes to unexplained movements (forecast errors) in 
each variable. Variance decomposition of the forecast error gives the percentage of unexpected variation in 
each variable that is produced by shocks from other variables. It indicates the relative impact that a 
variable has on another. The variance decomposition enables assessment of economic significance of this 
impact as a percentage of the forecast error for a variable sum to one. The orthogonalisation procedure of 
the VAR system decomposes the forecast error variance. The component measures the fraction in a 
variable explained by innovations/shocks in other variables. 
All variance decompositions start at zero because there is no forecast error at a zero lag. 
Table 8 – Results of the variance decomposition analysis for China  
  (1) (1) (1) (2) (2) (2)  (3)          (3)          (3)     
 step      fevd   Lower   Upper    fevd    Lower   Upper     fevd        Lower      Upper   
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1  .2803      
  -
.018425  
   
.579024   0 0 0 
2 .920046      .83105      100.904 .265078     
 -
.057737   
  
.587893   .079954    
  -
.009042     .16895 
3 .850494   .690937      101.005 .432551      .080857     .784244    .149506      -.01005      .309063 
4 .819075     .628843      100.931 .55357       .235503      .871636    .180925     
 -
.009308     .371157 
5 .790876     .577192      100.456 .614978      .306644     .923313    .209124      -.00456      .422808 
6 .771355    .537158      100.555  .671277     .379282     .963272   .228645     
 -
.005552     .462842 
7 .766905     .524469      100.934 .705557      .431549     .979566    .233095     
 -
.009341     .475531 
8  .768459     .525226     101.169 .72276       .45471       .99081     .231541     
 -
.011691     .474774 
   (4) (4) (4) 
step fevd        Lower        Upper 
0 0 0 0 
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1 .7197       .420976      101.843 
2 .734922      .412107      105.774 
3 .567449     .215756      .919143 
4 .44643       .128364     .764497 
5 .385022     .076687      .693356 
6 .328723    .036728     .620718 
7 .294443      .020434      .568451 
8 .27724     .00919       .54529 
95% lower and upper bounds reported 
(1) Irf name=var 1, impulse=lnGDP, and response=lnGDP  
(2) Irf name=var1, impulse=lnGDP, and response=lnME 
(3) Irf name=var1, impulse=lnME, and response=lnGDP 
(4) Irf name=var1, impulse=lnME, and response=lnME 
The analysis of the results shows that in (1) and (3), (with the preferred identification assumption) the GDP 
shock contributes 100% of the variance in the one-period-ahead forecast error for GDP, with the ME shock 
not contributing at all. As the forecast horizon moves further into the future, the effect of the GDP shock on 
ME increases and the shares converge to about 76,9% of variation in GDP being due to GDP shock and 
23.1% due to the ME shock in the period 8. Table (2)and (4) indicate  that  the GDP shock contributes 28% 
of the variance one-period-ahead forecast error for ME, with military expenditures contributing to the 
other 78%. As our forecast horizon moves further into the future, the effect of the GDP shock on ME 
increases and the shares converge to about 72% of variation in ME being due to GDP shock and to about 
28% due ME shock in the period 8. So the percentage of an unexpected variation in ME produced by a 
shock from GDP is very high in China in the long run.  
Below is the graphical representation of variance decomposition in China (FEVDs) : 
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FEVDs like IRF, can be sensitive to the identification assumptions we make. I computed FEVDs for 
alternative orderings and I find that the results are similar, then I gain confidence that my conclusions are 
not sensitive to the  assumptions I make about contemporaneous causality. 
 
5.4 The Toda-Yamamoto Granger causality test for United States 
 
Table 9 - Results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test for d2lnME in USA 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs = 2525 
   Interpolated Dickey-Fuller 
 Test 
Statistc 







Z(t) -3.398 -2.660 - -1.950 -1.600 
D. d2lnME Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
L1 -.9032472 .2658443 -3.40 0.002 -1.453188 -.3533063 
LD .0176421 .1442412 0.12 0.904 -.2807436 .3160278 
In the case of the Dickey-Fuller test for the variable d2lnME, the estimation of the reference model shown 
above, allows to evaluate the validity of the choice of the lag. In particular, if the highest lag corresponds to 
a t of Student (non-standard) in absolute value lower than 1.645, the test is performed again, reducing the 
lag, until the highest lag is significant (|t|> 1.645). In our case we have that 3,40 > 1,645, therefore the 
choice of lag equal to 1 is valid.  
We can then move on to the analysis of the Dickey-Fuller test results. From the comparison in absolute 
value of the statistic test t, of the ADF test (3,398) with the critical value at 5% (1.950), it emerges that the 
first is greater than the second in absolute value, so we can reject the null hypothesis and say that the 
series is stationary.  So the series is stationary to the second differences I(2).    
We proceed in the same way for the analysis of the GDP in logarithmic form and the analysis shows that 
the series is stationary at level I(0) as shown in the table of the variable lnGDP.  
So I can conclude that the maximum order of integration for the group of time-series (dmax) is equal to 
two. 
Table 10 - Results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test for lnGDP in USA 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs = 2527 
   Interpolated Dickey-Fuller 
 Test 
Statistc 







Z(t) -3.096 -2.657 - -1.950 -1.601 
lnGDP Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
L1 .0005079 -.0001641 3.10 0.005 .0001701 .0008458 
LD .4123876 .1715112 2.40 0.024 -.0591537 .7656215 
Secondly, we set up a VAR model in level and determine the appropriate maximum lag length (p) for the 
variables in the VAR (p) using the usual information criteria. In order to proceed to the causality analysis, 
the number of lags needed for the VAR model to be estimated is determined. 
Table 11 - Optimal number of lag for the VAR model in USA 
Selection-order criteria 
Sample: 1993-2018 Number of obs = 26 
lag LL LR df p FPE AIC HQIC SBIC 
0 22.1793    .000726 -1.55225 -1.52438 -1.45547 
1 118.882 193.4 4 0.000 5.8e-07 -8.68321 -8.59961 -8.39288 




3 142.323 10.356* 4 0.035 1.8e-
07* 
-9.87097* -9.67589* -9.19353 
Endogenous: lnME lnGDP 
Exogenous _cons 
 
The lag length is selected based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC). The optimal number of lags is 
therefore 3 based on the AIC criterion and on most of the reported criteria. This show that the la length 
prior to the augmentation is determinate as 3 where used the appropriate lag of the model in five due to 
the condition of VAR (p+dmax). 
To test the VAR model for the serial correlation in residuals 




Table 12 - Lagrange-multiplier test for VAR in USA 
Lagrange-multiplier test 
lag Chi2 df Prob > 
chi2 
1 4.1853 4 0.38150 
2 8.2383 4 0.08323 
H0 : No autocorrelation at lag order 
The results show that there is no serial correlation in residuals for our VAR model at 5% significance level.  
Now, after we know that the value of p+d=5 for the VAR (unrestricted) and p=3 for the VAR (restricted), we 
will perform the Toda-Yamamoto Granger causality test as follows: 
Table 13- Toda-Yamamoto Granger causality test from lnME to lnGDP for USA 
. test [lnGDP] L1.lnME [lnGDP] L2.lnME [lnGDP] L3.lnME 
(1) [lnGDP]L.lnME = 0 
(2) [lnGDP]L2.lnME = 0 
(3) [lnGDP]L3.lnME = 0 
chi2(  3)      = 8.28 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0406 
The previous Toda-Yamamoto Granger causality test tests for Granger's causality from military spending to 
GDP.  
Tabella 14 - Toda-Yamamoto Granger causality test from lnGDP to lnME for USA 
. test [lnME] L1.lnGDP [lnME] L2.lnGDP [lnME] L3.lnGDP 
(1) [lnME]L.lnGDP = 0 
(2) [lnME]L2.lnGDP = 0 
(3) [lnME]L3.lnGDP = 0 
chi2(  3) =   12.87 
Prob > chi2 =    0.0049 
The previous Toda-Yamamoto Granger causality test tests for Granger's causality from GDP to military 
spending.  
From the analysis of Toda-Yamamoto Granger causality, it emerges that for the United States there is a 
causality from GDP to military expenditure and vice versa. From the results it would also seem that the 
Toda-Yamamoto causality of military expenditures is better explained by the GDP than the latter is 
explained by military expenditures. The causality of military expenditures towards the GDP is valid at the 
confidence level of 5%, but it is not valid at the confidence level of 1%, while the T-Y Granger causality from 
GDP to military expenditures for the United States is valid at the confidence levels of 5% and 1%. So I can 
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argue that over time there has been a mutually reinforcing relationship between economic growth and 
military expenditures. 
5.5 Impulse response function (IRF) for United States 
Considering that the results of the T-Y Granger causality test show a causality at confidence level of  5% and 
1% from GDP to military expenditure, I decided to calculate the IRF, ordering the variables in this sense, i.e. 
first the GDP then the ME. However, in order to assess the reliability of the results the IRF was tested giving 
the reverse order to the variables. The results obtained are highlighted at the end of the paragraph. 
 
 
Figura 7 Impulse response function for USA 
The horizontal axis for each graph is in the units of time that your VAR is estimated in, in this case years; 
hence, the impulse–response graph shows the effect of a shock over a 8-years period. The vertical axis is in 
units of the variables in the VAR; in this case, everything is measured in percentage points, so the vertical 
units in all panels are percentage point changes. 
The first row shows the effect of a one-standard-deviation impulse to the GDP equation. A standard 
deviation shock to GDP leads to a decrease in military spending in the first year and up to the second, from 
the third year military spending starts to grow. The graphs is inside the 95% percent interval of confidence. 
Overall a shock to GDP will have negative impact on military expenditures in the short run and medium run 
(until the sixth year the graph is in the negative region), in the long run a shock to GDP will have a positive 
impact because the graph is in the positive region only after six years.  
The second row shows the effect of a one-standard-deviation impulse to the ME equation. The first thing to 
notice is that the effect is zero in the current period (at zero lag). This is a direct result of our identification 
assumption: we imposed the condition that military expenditures has no immediate effect on GDP in order 
to identify the shocks.  A standard deviation shock to ME however, does not seem to determine any 
significant change in GDP, which remains virtually stable throughout the period under consideration.  
Overall a shock to military expenditures will have a small but negative impact on GDP both in the short and 
long run because the graph is below but very near to the zero. 
In conclusion, facing a GDP shock, American military expenditures have a negative impact on the short run 
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positive impact on ME. On the other side, a shock on military expenditures  will have a small, but negative 
impact on the GDP on the short and long run in the US.  
IRFs can be sensitive to the identification assumptions I make. I computed IRFs for alternative orderings and 
I find that the results are similar, then I gain confidence that my conclusions are not sensitive to the  
assumptions I make about contemporaneous causality. 
 
5.6 Forecast-error variance decomposition (FEVDs) for the USA 
 
Table 15 - Results of the variance decomposition analysis for USA  
  (1) (1) (1) (2) (2) (2) (3) (3) (3) 
 step      fevd   Lower   Upper    fevd    Lower   Upper     fevd        Lower        Upper   
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 





   
.435952 0 0 0 
2 .971082   .911445  1.03072 .339208  
 -
.003784   .674631 .028918   -.030719 
   
.088555 
3 .953239   .848885      1.05759 .424357  .043614    .8051   .046761    -.057594  .151115 
4 .940635     .8049 1.07637 .447421   .235508     .871335    .059365  -.076369  .1951 
5 .931025     .77271     1.08934 .44591 -.00785 .89967  .068975   -.08934  .22729 
6 .92326    .746723      1.0998 
 
.441468    -.018679  .901615 .07674      -.099797  .253277 
7 .917482    .72669      1.10827 .449235    .001953 .896516   .082518  -.108275    .27331 
8  .913756  .525226     1.11424 .474481    .043793  .90517   .086244   -.114244     .286732 
  
  (4) (4) (4) 
step fevd        Lower        Upper 
0 0 0 0 
1 .828025 .564048 1.092 
2 .660792 .325369 .996216 
3 .575643 .1949 .956386 
4 .552579 .128665 .976492 
5 .55409 .10033 1.00785 
6 .558532 .098385 1.01868 
7 .550765 .103484 .998047 
8 .525519 .09483 .956207 
95% lower and upper bounds reported 
(1) Irf name-irf, impulse-lnGDP, and response-lnGDP  
(2) Irf name-irf, impulse-lnGDP, and response-lnME 
(3) Irf name-irf, impulse-lnME, and response-lnGDP 
(4) Irf name-irf, impulse-lnME, and response-lnME 
The left-column panels(tables 1 and 3)  show that (with the preferred identification assumption) the GDP 
shock contributes about 100% of the variance in the one-period-ahead forecast error for GDP, with the ME 
shock not contributing at all. As our forecast horizon moves further into the future, the effect of the ME 
shock on GDP increases just a little and the shares converge to more than 91% of variation in GDP being 
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due to the GDP shock and less than 9% due to the ME shock. The right-column panels (tables 2 and 4) 
indicate that the GDP shock contributes about 17,2% of the variance in the one-period-ahead forecast error 
for ME , with the ME contributing to the other 82,8%. As our forecast horizon moves further into the 
future, the effect of the GDP shock on military expenditures increases and the shares converge to more 
than 47,4% of variation in ME being due to GDP shock and less than 52,6% due to ME shock. In any case it 
can be concluded that in the United States, military expenditures have zero impact in predicting GDP in the 
short term, and also in the long term the impact of military expenditures in predicting GDP is very low. 
Regarding the GDP's ability to predict military expenditure, it can be seen from the analysis that in the short 
run it is rather weak, not exceeding 20%, while in the long term (8) it reaches about 47%. So the percentage 
of an unexpected variation in ME produced by a shock from GDP in USA is not as high as it is in China where 
it reached about 72% in the long run. The results lead to assumptions about the possible existence of 
factors different from GDP,  that could explain military spending in the United States, as supposed in the 
starting hypothesis. 
 
Below is the graphical representation of the variance decomposition (FEVDs):  
 
Figure 8 Graphical representation of variance decomposition analysis for USA 
FEVDs like IRF, can be sensitive to the identification assumptions we make. I computed FEVDs for 
alternative orderings and I find that the results are similar, then I gain confidence that my conclusions are 
not sensitive to the  assumptions I make about contemporaneous causality. 
 
6 Summary and conclusions 
The analysis carried out allows you to outline the following stylized facts: 
a.  
a) The Chinese military expenditure at constant prices is perfectly positive correlated with the 
GDP in the Chinese economy, while for the United States, there is an average correlation 
between the two variables considered. This result makes it possible to investigate whether 
there is causality between the two variables and the possible impact of such causality in the 







0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4 6 8
irf, lnGDP, lnGDP irf, lnGDP, lnME
irf, lnME, lnGDP irf, lnME, lnME
95% CI fraction of mse due to impulse
step
Graphs by irfname, impulse variable, and response variable
18 
 
econometric analysis using three main tools: Toda-Yamamoto's approach to Granger's 
causality, the Impulse Response Function, and the Forecast Error Variance Decomposition.  
b) A T-Y Granger causality test for China show that there is a causality from GDP to military 
expenditure, but not from military expenditure to GDP. This result confirms our starting 
hypothesis that the increase in Chinese military expenditures follows the exploit in GDP growth 
that characterizes this country. From the analysis of T-Y Granger causality test for USA, it 
emerges that there is a causality from GDP to military expenditure and vice versa. From the 
results it would also seem that the Toda-Yamamoto Granger causality of military expenditures 
is better explained by the GDP than the latter is explained by military expenditures. The 
causality of military expenditures towards the GDP is valid at the confidence level of 5%, but it 
is not valid at the confidence level of 1%, while the T-Y Granger causality from GDP to military 
expenditures for the United States is valid at the confidence levels of 5% and 1%. So from a 
political economy point of view I can argue that over time there has been a mutually reinforcing 
relationship between economic growth and military expenditures in the US. 
c) The Chinese IRFs shows that overall a shock to GDP will have positive impact on military 
expenditures both in the short and in the long run because the graph is in the positive region 
and a shock to military expenditures will have a positive impact on GDP both in the short and 
long run because the graph is above the zero. In conclusion these results about the IRFs, are 
consistent with the a priory expectations because military expenditures grow following GDP 
shock, as hypothesized in our model and as inferred from the conclusions of T-Y Granger 
causality test. The USA IRFs shows that overall a shock to GDP will have negative impact on 
military expenditures in the short and medium run (until the sixth year the graph is in the 
negative region), in the long run a shock to GDP will have a positive impact because the graph is 
in the positive region only after six years. At the same time, a shock to military expenditures 
will have a negative impact on GDP both in the short and long run because the graph is below 
but near the zero.  
d) From the FEVDs analysis for China the analysis shows that the percentage of an unexpected 
variation in ME produced by a shock from GDP is very high in the long run (72%). But the 
percentage of an unexpected variation in ME produced by a shock from GDP in USA is not as 
high as it is in China and it reached about 47% in the long run. So from the variance 
decomposition analysis I can conclude that the starting hypothesis  is validated, in fact, in 
China, unlike the United States, the increase in military spending is essentially due to the 
increase in resources made available by China's economic boom. On the other hand, in the 
United States, the high military expenditure is explained only partly and to a limited extent  by 
the variation in GDP, suggesting that there are other factors that can explain this variation. So I 
can conclude that the level of military expenditures in the United States is determined also by a 
strategic decision and not only by GDP trends, as I argued in my previous works (Gentilucci, 
2019, 2013).  This result could be the outcome of power interpenetrations, spanning from 
military spending to economic growth (or GDP) and from economic growth (or GDP) to military 
spending.  
From the results of econometric analysis, it is possible to conclude that the increase in Chinese military 
expenditure, unlike American military expenditure, is strongly determined by the increase in GDP. For this 
reason, unlike what happens for American military expenditures, it could be argued that, the increase in 
Chinese military expenditures are the result of the country's economic growth and that this increase is, 
however, much lower than the increase in GDP. About the American military expenditures we can conclude 
that there are other factors than GDP, explaining American military expenditures. This achievement suggest 
that strategic dynamics in military expenditures are driven from GDP in China, but not in US. These results 
validate my staring hypothesis and enable a further and in-depth analysis of the causes and factors that 
determine the variation in US military spending. It seems, therefore, that in line with the arguments  of 
Gentilucci (2019), military spending in the US follows a much more autonomous dynamic and at least 
partially independent from GDP trends.  
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At the same time, as pointed out above, these results are limited by the scope of the factors considered to 
explain the strategic dimension of military spending. Certainly, in order to fully understand the role of the 
military as a strategic factor in the two countries, it is necessary to evaluate many political, geographical 
and economic factors, which involve the analysis, among other things, of access to natural and strategic 
resources for the two countries. And this would be the subject of further research work.  
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